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Tribal Sell-Government and the Indian Reorganization

Act of 1934
The Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 19341 (IRA)
was, by all accounts, one of the most significant single pieces of legislation directly affecting Indians ever enacted by the Congress of the
United States. It has been "equalled in scope and significance only
by the legislation of June 30, 1834, and the General Allotment Act of
February 8, 1887."2 A major reversal of governmental policy and
approach toward Indian affairs was effectuated by the IRA. This
Comment will be concerned with the IRA as it affected the concept
of tribal self-government, and primarily with those sections providing
for adoption of tribal constitutions and organization as chartered
business corporations. It will trace the development of tribal selfgovernment through 1934, delve into the Act itself and the objectives
behind it, consider whether those objectives have been realized, and
suggest a possible role for the IRA and its theory in the future.
I.

INTRODUCTION:

A

BACKGROUND SKETCH

The right of tribal self-government is probably the most basic
concept in all of Indian law. It has been consistently protected by the
federal courts.8 Indeed, the courts have played such a large role in
asserting and reaffirming this principle that, although the right is an
inherent part of original sovereignty, the doctrine itself may be said
to be judicial. The principle, broadly stated, is that the tribes are
"qualified to exercise powers of self-government, not by virtue of
any delegation of powers from the Federal Government, but rather by
reason of their original tribal sovereignty. " 4 While these inherent
powers have been greatly reduced over the years by Congress in the
exercise of its power over "commerce ... with the Indian Tribes"5
and by the executive branch through treaty-making, it remains true,
I. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(1970).
2. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 84 (Univ. New Mexico ed. undated).
On June 30, 1834, Congress passed two acts. One was the last in a series of acts "to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes," ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, which set
the pattern for Indian-government relationships for the next century. The second
created the Department of Indian Affairs, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 735, originally under the
War Department, transferred to the Interior Department upon its establishment in
1849, Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 9, 9 Stat. 395 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1451 (1970)).
For a discussion of the General Allotment Act, see notes 28-36 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959).
4. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122.
5. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
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nonetheless, that one looks to the statutes and treaties to discover
limitations on, not sources of, tribal power.
The first comprehensive judicial expression of this doctrine is
found in John Marshall's opinion in the famous case of Worcester v.
Georgia.6 The State of Georgia had for years been doing its best to
destroy the Cherokee Nation. It imprisoned a white man living with
tribal consent among the Cherokee for violating a state law that
required such persons to acquire a permit from the governor.7 The
Supreme Court found this law unconstitutional, holding that the
State could not infringe upon the federal power over Indians. The
tribes were entitled to exercise their own self-government, to the
exclusion of state law, subject only to federal power. Resting his
analysis largely on principles of international law, the Chief Justice
further recognized that the tribes "had always been considered as
distinct, independent, political communities,"8 and that "the settled
doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating
with a stronger, and taking its protection." 9
While this doctrine of tribal self-government has been recognized
and applied by the federal courts,10 it has not been so highly respected
by administrative officials.11 For more than a century federal administrators failed to recognize the doctrine's implications. This failure
was not entirely a result of administrative malevolence, but in large
part was due to ignorance of the law, bureaucratic ineptness, and
the general confusion of the American frontier. 12 In addition to administrative confusion the nineteenth century witnessed the enactment of many federal statutes that had the effect of seriously diminishing the area within which tribal powers could be exercised. The
matters taken from the control of the tribes were those which, in the
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. Law of Dec. 22, 1830, § 7 [1830] Ga. Acts 115-16.
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558.
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560. It was of the Worcester case that President Andrew Jackson
is reported to have said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it."
H. GREELEY, 1 .AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864) (statement attributed to President Jackson
by Congressman George N. Briggs). In fact, the State never released the defendant, but
left him imprisoned under the unconstitutional law. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 123.
While the Worcester decision was prophetic in terms of judicial doctrine, its recognition
of tribal sovereignty was not enough to prevent the tragic Cherokee removal to the
Oklahoma territory, the "Trail of Tears," a few years later. See, e.g., A. JosEPHY, THE
INDIAN HERITAGE OF .AMEruCA 323-24 (Bantam ed. 1969).
IO. See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
11. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122-23.
12. For more comprehensive treatment of this doctrine, sec F. COHEN, supra note 2,
at 122-26; Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145 (1940)
[hereinafter Federal Courts]; Solicitor's Opinion, Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior
Dec. 14 (1934).
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judgment of Congress, the tribes could no longer safely handle.13
The vast majority of these enactments applied by their terms to
only one tribe or group of tribes; thus it is difficult and inappropriate
to generalize about their effects. There were, however, a few major
pieces of legislation that applied broadly to all Indians. An example
of how seriously these acts limited tribal sovereignty can be seen in
the effects of the Major Crimes Act of 1885.14
In the case of Ex parte Crow Dog,15 the doctrine of tribal sovereignty had been applied to produce what many considered an extreme result. The Supreme Court there held that the murder of one
Sioux by another on the reservation was not within the criminal
jurisdiction of any court of the United States, state or federal, and
that only the tribe could punish the offense. The Court, of course,
reached the right result in light of the doctrine of original sovereignty.16 Nonetheless, this result so outraged the public and the Congress that in less than two years the Major Crimes Act was passed.
Under the Act original jurisdiction was given to the federal courts
over cases involving the crimes of murder, manslaughter, rape, assault
·with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny, when committed on
Indian land by one Indian against another. To this list, robbery,
incest, and assault with a deadly weapon were later added.17 Usurpation of tribal control over the conduct of its members was no doubt
far-reaching because of the consequent authorization of intervention
by federal officers when these crimes were committed and discovered.
It is worth noting, however, that the mere existence of this legislation
reaffirmed the principle of tribal sovereignty. Congressional action
resulted from a recognition that unless a federal law was enacted the
13. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 122. There are many examples, the most important
of which are probably the enactments dealing with Indian trade (see 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-64
(1970)) and liquor regulation (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-56 (1970)).
14. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,
3242 (1970), upheld in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
15. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
16. The contention that the federal courts had jurisdiction was based not on principles applicable to tribes generally, but on the language of a treaty with the Sioux.
Treaty with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635. The Court found that language
insufficient and then went on to apply the sovereignty doctrine. 109 U.S. at 567.
17. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 328-29, 35 Stat. 1151; Act of March 3, 1911,
ch. 231, § 296, 36 Stat. 1167; and Act of June 28, 1932, ch. 284, 47 Stat. 337 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1970)). The crimes of carnal knowledge of a female i,mder
sLxteen and assault with intent to rape were added in 1966. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-707, 80 Stat. 1101 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1970)). In 1968 assault
resulting in serious bodily injury was added. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 284,
§ 501, 82 Stat. 80 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970)). These crimes, plus infringement
of a few federal laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 438, 1154-65, 1853 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 179, 202 (1970)), constitute the only acts of Indians against each other on Indian land that are federal crimes. All other such offenses
are solely within tribal jurisdiction.
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tribes would retain control and exclusive jurisdiction over these
offenses. Indeed, to the extent that such power has not been taken
from them, tribes today continue to exercise control over law and
order on the reservation through tribal codes, tribal courts, and tribal
police.18
Another event that altered the attitude toward tribal self-government was the cessation of treaty-making between the federal government and the tribes in 1871.19 The House of Representatives had no
effective control over Indian affairs, which rested exclusively with
the President and the Senate under the treaty power,20 and opposition
to this lack of power was growing.21 Attacks on treaty-making were
also being voiced from within the administration.22 Concepts of
assimilation and citizenship began to be pressed by those opposed to
treaty-making, particularly those within the administration. Since the
close of the Civil War, the House had used this opposition to insert
progressively more restrictive wording into Indian appropriation
acts.23 The culmination finally came in 1871 when the House managed
to tack onto the 1872 fiscal appropriation bill the following clause:
"Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty." 24 Despite this ominous
language, tribal sovereignty in terms of powers of self-government
continued to be recognized. Treaties were replaced by Indian "agreements," which differed only in that they were ratified by both houses
of Congress.25 In theory, these private agreements, like treaties, were
based on Indian consent. As will be seen, this principle of mutual
consent was reaffirmed by the IRA. Thus, while the form of dealing
with the tribes was altered in 1871, the actual effect on tribal powers
was probably minimal.
There were other more serious restrictions on tribal power in the
latter years of the nineteenth century. The decade of the 1890's saw,
for example, the development of a policy of Indian education that
18. See COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND REsPONSIBILlTIES OF THE .AMERICAN
INDIAN, THE INDIAN, .AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BusINFSS 56-60 (W. Brophy &: S. Aberle ed.
1966) [hereinafter BROPHY CoMMJSSION].
19. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1970)).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
21. See F. WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 11 (1874).
22. See 1862 REPORT CoMMR. INDIAN .AFFAIRS 7. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 2,
at 17-18.
23. See, e.g., Act of March 29, 1867, ch. 13, § 6, 15 Stat. 9 (repealed by Act of July
20, 1867, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 18).
24. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566.
25. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1882, ch. 284, 22 Stat. 157 (Crows); Act of April 29, 1874,
ch. 134, 18 Stat. 36 (Utes).
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had a severe impact on tribal self-control. For example, an appropriations act authorized the Secretary of Interior to withhold the furnishing of subsistence or rations to any Indian family whose children did
not attend school.26 These restrictive practices were compounded by
the practice of encouraging the removal of Indian children from their
parents and sending them to distant nonreservation boarding
schools.27 Such practices resulted in severe deterioration of tribal
unity and control over internal domestic affairs.
Of all pre-IRA legislation, by far the most devastating was the
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887.28 This Act authorized the
President to parcel tribal land to individual tribal members in "allotments" of 40, 80, or 160 acres. Any surplus land was to be purchased
by the Secretary of Interior with proceeds used to further Indian
education and "civilization." Originally, each allotment was to be
held in trust by the United States for at least twenty-five years. At the
end of this time, or a longer time should it be determined necessary
in individual cases, the Government issued a fee patent to the land,
free of liens and debts, to the allottee or his heirs. Inheritance was
determined according to state law.
The general theory underlying the allotment policy was that an
individual Indian who mvned his own plot of land would thereby be
transformed into a farmer or livestock operator. Presumably, the individual was to absorb European values to go with his new status.
Individual mvnership plus increased contact with whites was to teach
the Indian to be both civilized and self-supporting, one consequence
of which would be to relieve the Government of the need for further
supervision of Indian affairs and life. Another consequence, of_course,
was to throw open to whites huge quantities of land previously unavailable.29 There had been earlier allotments under treaties and
laws that applied to certain individual tribes, so but the Dawes Act
was the first to subdivide and redistribute land on a wholesale basis.
By all accounts, the allotment policy was a disaster.31 Destruction
of the land base had the immediate effect of reducing tribal control
of internal affairs to almost a nullity. Further, although the Indian
culture was widely diverse from tribe tq tribe, nowhere did that cul26. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 635 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 283 (1970)).
27. See BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 9, 149-51.
28. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, ch. 9, 25 U.S.C. (1970).
29. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Hearings]; BROPHY COMMISSION,
supra note 18, at 18-20.
30. E.g., Treaty of Sept. 20, 1816, art. 4, 7 Stat. 150 (Chickasaws); Treaty of July 18,
1817, art. 8, 7 Stat. 159 (Cherokees).
31. See, e.g., 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 15-18 (memorandum by Commr.
Collier); BROPHY CoMMISSioN, supra note 18, at 18-20.
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ture contain anything to prepare the individual Indian to become a
farmer or to assume the incidents of private ownership. Finally, the
Act itself made no provision for training or credit.
The allotment era extended from 1887 to 1934, when the IRA
ended the practice completely in so far as it applied to tribally owned
lands.s2 Publication of the Meriam Report38 in 1928 caused a significant slowdown of allotment parceling,84 but by then the damage had
been done. Before the dust settled, 246,569 separate assignments of
land had been made totaling nearly 41 million acres.86 The damage
in loss of land base was astounding. Between 1887 and 1934 tribal
land holdings were reduced from about 138 million acres to only 48
million acres.s 6
During the period preceding the enactment of the IRA there was
some recognition that Indians were living in grinding poverty, that
Indian health and education were in an abominable state, and that
government policies were not working. As early as 1881 books like
Helen Hunt Jackson's crusading A Century of Dishonor had exposed
these conditions to public view and made people aware of broken
treaties and other unfulfilled promises. But it was not until publication of the Meriam Report that a movement toward change began.
The Report is an extremely detailed document, describing and analyzing the entire spectrum of Indian life and the problems of governmental administration of Indian affairs. It brought these problems
into sharp focus, and in so doing presaged more than any other work
the enactment of the IRA six years later.37
The basic position taken by the Meriam staff was that
[t]he object of work with or for the Indians is to fit them either to
merge into the social and economic life of the prevailing civilization
as developed by the whites or to live in the presence of that civilization at least in accordance with a minim.um standard of health and
decency.ss
If this goal were accomplished, as the staff saw it, there would be no
need for further governmental supervision. This position did not
imply automatic cultural assimilation, however. The authors of the
Report recognized explicitly that many Indians wished to maintain
a separate cultural identity, although they also admitted this would
32. 25 u.s.c. § 461 (1960).
33. !NSTlTUTE FOR GOVT. R.F.5EARCH, STUDIES IN .AD1,0NISTRATION, THE PRODLD{ OF
INDIAN .ADMINISTRATION (1928) [hereinafter MERIAM: REPORT].
34. BROPHY CoMMISSION, supra note 18, at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 83.
i
I
38. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 33, at 86.
~I• -
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be difficult in so far as the economic underpinnings of the old culture
had been destroyed. 89
The process of allotment as historically administered was criticized,40 as were other approaches to the "Indian problem":
The work of the government directed toward the education and advancement of the Indian himself ... is largely ineffective. The chief
explanation ... lies in the fact that the government has not appropriated enough funds to permit the Indian Service to employ an
adequate personnel properly qualified for the task before it.41
The Meriam staff sought to redirect the approach to Indian affairs
by development of the social services necessary to enable Indians to
reach a level of self-support.
There were many other specific recommendations, among which
was the suggestion that "[t]horough mature consideration ... be given
to the possibilities of using the corporate form of organization for
tribal property that consists of great natural resources which cannot
be economically administered or developed in small allotments."42
Although the Report did not recommend corporations as a means of
developing Indian community life and civic organization, its recommendations for those aspects of Indian life could be effectuated by
utilization of the corporate form. 48
The recommendations of the Meriam Report fell short of the
broad-ranging goals later expressed by the IRA. For example, decentralization of authority was recommended, but to local Indian agents
rather than to the tribes themselves.44 Still, the publication of this
work was an event of major importance in the history of Indian affairs and was a significant stimulus in the direction the IRA was later
to follow.

II. THE INDIAN R.EoRGANIZATION Acr OF 1934
A. A Brief Legislative History
The Wheeler-Howard Bill, as the originally proposed legislation
was known, was entitled an act "[t]o grant to Indians living under
Federal tutelage the freedom to organize for purposes of local selfgovernment and economic enterprise."45 The bill represented a sig39. Id. at 86-89.
40. Id. at 41-42.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 462. The Report went on to suggest as "outstanding possibilities" for experimentation ·with this idea the K.lamaths of Oregon and the Menominees of Wisconsin, the most important of the tribes that were later "terminated" in the 1950's.
Id. For an explanation of the termination policy, see note 159 infra.
43. See MERIAM REPORT, supra note 33, at 629-45.
44. Id. at 113, 140-54.
.
45. H.R. 7902, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and S. 2755, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
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nificant change in the approach to Indian legislation. Although the
original Wheeler-Howard Bill was greatly restructured in the final
version that became the IRA, some knowledge of its provisions is
useful.
Title I of the Wheeler-Howard Bill, "Indian Self-Government,"
was the heart of the proposed legislation. In it were set forth the broad
principles of self-government and the specific policy goal that "those
functions of government now exercised over Indian reservations by
the Federal Government through the Department of Interior and
the Office of Indian Affairs shall be gradually relinquished and transferred to the Indians of such reservations ...." 46
The vehicle contemplated for realization of this goal was organization "for municipal and other purposes."47 Title I provided for
issuance of charters "granting to the ... community group any or
all of such powers of government and such privileges of corporate organization and economic activity, hereinafter enumerated, as may
seem fitting"48 in light of a particular group's experience. Some mandatory charter requirements were imposed, such as a provision delineating membership criteria.49 In addition, optional powers were listed,
among which was the power
[t]o organize and act as a Federal municipal corporation, to establish
a form of government, to adopt and thereafter to amend a constitution, and to promulgate and enforce ordinances ... and [to exercise]
any other functions customarily exercised by local governments.GO
The term "constitution" was not used elsewhere in the bill. Unlike
the final Act, which contemplates adoption of a constitution as the
principal organizational method, the original bill was centered
around the concept of the municipal-type corporate charter. The remainder of Title I established procedures for adopting a charter and
enumerated the powers and duties of chartered tribes and of the
Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
[hereinafter S. 2755]. The bill was introduced into the House by Representative Howard
on Feb. 12, 1934, 78 CONG. REc. 2437 (1934), and into the Senate by Senator Wheeler
one day later, 78 CoNG. REc. 2440 (1934). The authorship of the bill is unclear, although
the bill was apparently the product of a joint effort by Commissioner of Indian Affairs
John Collier and Assistant Solicitor of the Department of Interior Felix S. Cohen.
46. S. 2755, supra note 45, tit. I, § I (1934).
47. Id.
48. Id., tit. I, § 2.
49. Id., tit. I, § 3. Also specifically required was a provision guaranteeing "the civil
liberties of minorities and individuals within the community, including the liberty of
conscience, worship, speech, press, assembly, and association." Id. This provision was
dropped from the final version. A forcible application of these guarantees on the
tribes did not appear again in federal legislation until 1968. Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-03, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801-03 (1970)). See
note 159 infra.
50. S. 2755, supra note 45, tit. I, § 4(a).
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Title IV established a federal court of Indian affairs. This court
would have taken over original jurisdiction from the district courts
in certain matters such as crimes against the United States committed
on a reservation and commercial disputes between a tribe and outsiders.61 Furthermore, the court would have appellate jurisdiction
over the tribal courts in those cases in which it would have original
jurisdiction.62 All mention of these special courts was eliminated
from the final Act, primarily because the committee members and
Indians disagreed, ·with each other and among themselves, whether
they would be a boon or a hindrance to tribal sovereignty.63
After the Wheeler-Howard Bill was introduced in February of
1934, extensive hearings were held in both houses of Congress.64 As
these hearings progressed, it became apparent that disagreement over
the effects of the bill was deep. Various suggestions for amendment
were made before the Senate Committee, but by mid-May progress
had nearly stopped. Fearful that the proposed legislation would not
be passed, the proponents took drastic action. The bill was quickly
rewritten and all its controversial provisions were discarded. 65 In its
new form, 66 the bill was barely recognizable. This new version, as
amended, became the IRA.67 The major objectives and philosophy
behind the legislation, however, remained unchanged.
51. Id., tit. IV, §§ 3-4.
52. Id., tit. IV, § 5.
53. Titles II and III were less immediately related to questions of tribal sovereignty.
Title II concerned "Special Education for Indians." The Commissioner was directed
to train Indians for jobs through the use of existing or new facilities. An important
innovation was the specifically declared policy of promoting the study of Indian culture
in Indian schools.
Title m dealt with Indian lands. Most of its provisions were carried over in substance into the IRA. One particularly interesting provision of this Title, however, did
not find its way into the final Act. Section 14 would have allowed "classification" of
reservation land into units according to economic suitability. It was in effect a zoning
enabling provision.
54. Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, '73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Senate Hearings]; 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29.
55. As Senator Wheeler put it, "The bill as it originally came from the Department
had many objectionable features, which were eliminated from it. Many of the Indians
throughout the country were opposed to the original bill, and the committee was
opposed to it, and amended it ••• as it is now framed." '78 CoNG. REc. 11124 (1934).
The Senate Committee, on May 1'7, had the new version of the bill before it; and the
new bill, renumbered as S. 3645, was introduced into the Senate on May 18. '78 CONG.
REc. 9071 (1934).
56. S. 3645, '73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
5'7. Debate in the Congress did not begin until after the introduction of the new
bill, S. 3645, The Senate Committee reported out S. 3645 four days after its reintroduction, 78 CoNG. REc. 9221 (1934), and floor debate was taken up shortly thereafter.
On June 12, the Senate passed the bill. Id. at 11139. The House began debate on
June 15. Id. at 11724-44. By suspension of the rules, the original House bill, H.R. 7902,
was laid on the table, and S. 3645 was passed in lieu of H.R. 7902 on the same day,
with some variations. Id. A conference committee was formed immediately, and it
submitted a report on June 16. Id. at 12001-04. The agreed-upon final version was that
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B. The Act's Objectives: An Analytical Look Behind the Scenes
The thrust of the IRA can be gathered from its operative provisions. Every section in some way affects tribal self-government, although obviously not all are equally relevant to this discussion. 08
Section I of the IRA ended the policy of allotment: "No land of
any Indian reservation . . . shall be allotted in severalty to any
Indian.'' 59 This provision, while not going directly to self-government, was a key factor in making it possible; it alone assures the
Act's historical significance.
Section 4 related to alienation. In general, it prohibited any transfer of Indian land or shares in the assets of tribal corporations otherwise than to the tribe, except that the Secretary could authorize
voluntary exchanges of such lands or interests of equal value when it
would be "expedient and beneficial for or compatible with the proper
consolidation of Indian lands.''60 This provision has had the desirable
effect of further strengthening the tribal land base and tribal control
over it.
Section 10 set up a revolving fund from which the Secretary of
Interior could make loans to chartered corporations for purposes of
economic development. 61 This reversed an earlier policy by which
loans were made to individual Indians and under which there had
been problems in repayment. 62 Under the IRA, loans are made only
to the tribes, with individual loans being arranged between the tribe
and the individual.63 Also, section II appropriated a small amount
of funds to be used for loans to Indians for tuition payment and other
expenses in "recognized vocational and trade schools" and in high
schools and colleges.64
Section 18 provided that the Act would not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians voted against its application at a special election to be held within one year after the Act's
which became the IRA. Both houses of Congress approved it on June 16. Id. at 1200104, 12161-65. It was presented to the President on June 18, id. at 12340, and was signed
on that date, id. at 12451.

58. For a summary of the provisions of the entire Act, see F. CoHEN, supra note 2,
at 84-85.
59. 25 u.s.c. § 461 (1970).
60. 25 u.s.c. § 464 (1970).
61. 25 u.s.c. § 470 (1970).
62. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-195:J: A. Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 369 n.81 (1953) (citing unpublished report showing a 44% delinquency
rate in 1933) [hereinafter Erosion of Rights].
63. See 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1970). Tribes borrowing under this provision have main•
tained a default rate of less than 1%, See Erosion of Rights, supra note 62, at 369.
64. 25 U.S.C. § 471 (1970). Substantially more funds had been previously authorized,
through quite different procedures, for Indian education and other purposes by the
Johnson-O'Malley Act of April 16, 1934, ch. 147, 48 Stat. 596, as amended, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 452-54 (1970).
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approval. 65 This section marked a significant change in approach to
Indian legislation. Formerly, legislation had been either special, applying by its terms to only one tribe or group of tribes, 66 or general,
applying to all Indians without consideration of tribal differences. 67
Through section 18, the IRA became a type of enabling act, giving
each tribe the opportunity to determine for itself whether it wanted
to come under the Act. There was, however, a major flaw in the approach: a tribe could hold the election only once. If it voted against
application, it did not have the option of later reconsideration. 68
The essence of the IRA lay in those provisions relating directly to
tribal organization, viz., sections 16 and 17. The former provided:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall
have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an
appropriate constitution and by-laws ..•. [Procedure is then established for ratification by members and approval by the Secretary of
Interior].
In addition to all powers vested in any tribe or tribal council by
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To
employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests
in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to
negotiate with the Federal, State, and local governments....69
Section 17 first provided for issuance of a charter of incorporation to
a tribe and established procedures for petition and ratification. It
continued:
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, o,m, hold, manage,
operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to
issue in exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and such
further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate
65. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1970). The time for holding elections was extended another year
by Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 260, § 2, 49 Stat. 378.
66. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 591-94a (1970) (Chippewa Tribe of Minnesota); 25 U.S.C.
§§ 671-76b-1 (1970) (Ute Indians of Utah).
67. See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, ch. 9,
25 u.s.c. (1970).
68. It might still be possible to organize outside the IRA, but IRA funds would not
then be available.
69. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). The reasons for the rather unusual juxtaposition of the
terms "constitution" and "by-laws" are obscure. All tribes that adopted constitutions
pursuant to the IRA also appear to have adopted by-laws. These by-laws may be unnecessary, since, for the most part, they contain governmental provisions that easily
could have been written into the constitutions. See, e.g., By-Laws of the Stockbridge
Munsee Community of Wisconsin, in CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND BY-LAws OF INDIAN
TRIBES OF NORTH A.MERICA, pt. II, at 112-13 (G. Fay ed. 1967) [hereinafter G. FAY].
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business, not inconsistent with law; but no authority shall be granted
to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the
land included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued
shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of Congress,70

The purpose of adopting a charter is different than that of adopting
a constitution, the charter being oriented more toward business than
toward governmental organization.71
Perhaps the prime objective of the IRA, which was crucial to any
effective establishment of self-government, was elimination of the
"absolutist" executive discretion previously exercised by the Interior
Department and the Office of Indian Affairs. During the hearings,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier presented to the House
Committee examples which revealed the vastness of this discretionary
power.72 Not only had administrative power grown beyond control,
but its exercise and the effects of its exercise also changed from year
to year, depending on the attitude or whim of a given commissioner.
Further, this discretionary power was also exercised by local agency
superintendents, a situation that led Senator Wheeler to refer to the
local agent as "a czar."73 So all-encompassing was this power that "the
Department [had] absolute discretionary powers over all organized
expressions of the Indians. . . . [T]ribal councils exist[ed] by [the
Department's] sufferance and [had] no authority except as ... granted
by the Department."74 Consequently, the IRA sought to eliminate
this boundless discretion or at least place a damper on its exercise.
"This bill ... seeks to get away from the bureaucratic control of the
Indian Department, and it seeks further to give the Indians the control of their own affairs . . . ." 75
It was not entirely clear, however, precisely what changes were to
be made. Commissioner Collier was the moving force behind the new
administrative approach. Of course, as Commissioner, he already
possessed broad powers to move the Indian Office in the desired direction. Apparently, however, he was one of that rare breed of administrators who seek actively to undermine their own powers through
legislation. To be sure, the Office would not become powerless under
the Act. Subsequent developments have shown that it can and will
70. 25 u.s.c. § 477 (1970).
71. Typical charters include provisions on borrowing money, making contracts, and
handling funds. See, e.g., Corporate Charter of the Lower Brule Tribe of South Dakota,
§ 5, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. I, at 36-37; Corporate Charter of the Lac Du Flambeau
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of the Lac Du Flambeau Reservation, Wis•
consin, in G. FAY, supra, pt. II, at 24-25.
72. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 47-48.
73. 78 CONG. R.Ec. 11125 (1934).
74. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 52 (memorandum of Commr. Collier),
75. 78 CoNG. R.Ec. 11125 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler).
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exercise much power, often to the detriment of its constituency.76
And the Commissioner himself, in a memorandum to the House
Committee, said, "The bill does not bring to an end, or imply or
contemplate, a cessation of Federal guardianship ..•. On the contrary, it makes permanent the guardianship services, and reasserts
them ...." 77 He sharply distinguished between these "guardianship
services," which he sought to retain, and administrative absolutism.
Commissioner Collier's goal was to move toward the elimination of
the Office of Indian Affairs in its present capacity and he hoped that
it would "ultimately exist as a purely advisory and special service
body [as is] the Department of Agriculture [vis-a-vis] American farm.ers,"78 a goal as yet unrealized.
Throughout the hearings there were repeated statements evidencing the desire to trim administrative power. Those concerned with
Indian affairs well recognized the futility of attempts at tribal selfgovernment as long as this power remained unchecked. Such "unlimited and largely unreviewable exercise of administrative discretion
. . . [had] been one of the chief sources of complaint" 79 by Indians.
The Commissioner attempted to assure those concerned that it was
"the chief object of the bill to terminate such bureaucratic authority
by transferring the administration of the Indian Service to the Indian
communities themselves."80 But such assurances were not enough to
assuage the fears of those opposed to excessive bureaucratic control.
The problem was that the original bill on its face retained broad
governmental powers to review and even to veto tribal actions. 81 An
attorney who belonged to the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, testifying
against the original bill, brought this problem into sharp focus. 82
He expressed concern not only about past bureaucratic authority but
also about the proposed continuance of that authority. As justification for his fears, he cited a case holding that there was no judicial
review of departmental exercise of discretionary powers, generally
on the theory that the decisions of the Secretary of Interior were made
final and conclusive by various federal statutes. 83 But the real prob76. See generally Erosion of Rights, supra note 62.
77. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 20.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Id. (memorandum of Commr. Collier).
80. Id.
81. See S. 2755, supra note 45, tit. I, §§ 3-5, 9.
82. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 152 (statement of Thomas Sloan).
83. Id., citing Red Hawk v. Wilber, 39 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (decision of Secretary
regarding distribution of alloted lands of Indian dying before issuance of patent held
not reviewable by court). The doctrine remains alive in Indian law. See, e.g., Twin
Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.
1967) (discretionary action of Secretary approving amendments to tribal constitution
held not reviewable even under the Administrative Procedure Act).
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lem, as he saw it, was not high level exercise of these powers. Rather,
"[t]he trouble with the actual administration of affairs is that the
Secretary himself does not exercise [these] authorities; they are exercised by superintendents who are not in sympathy with the Indian.
• • ."84 The result was that the local agents, by exercising these
statutory authorities, had obtained nearly absolute control over all
aspects of Indian life. This sad fact, combined with general unavailability of judicial review, produced much of the existing agony. If
the Act could change this, it would accomplish much. 86
Prior to the IRA, formulation of policy respecting Indian affairs
generally was made without consultation of the tribes concerned.
The IRA sought to alter this approach so that "in the future the
Indians would be consulted and their views followed, if feasible, in
the formulation of new policy."86 The importance of this new approach is difficult to overemphasize. "Even when the [Indians are
not properly consulted] ... the very acceptance of the philosophy of
consent and conference is a restraint on arbitrary administrative action. An administrator who is aware that his thinking will be subjected to the careful scrutiny of the Indians and their friends will be
inclined to review [new programs] most carefully."87 Until foundering on the rocks of "termination" in the 1950's,88 this new approach
proved its over-all worth.89 The IRA did not, however, accomplish
all that was promised toward granting autonomy to the tribes. Even
under the final Act, the Secretary was empowered to review many
actions of the tribal governments,00 and still retains close control over
tribal government.91 The rationale for this federal control was that
at the time of the adoption of tribal constitutions and charters under
84. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 152.
85. An interesting suggestion was forwarded by a representative of the Mission
Indians of Southern California: "We believe that if a direct, simple method of recalling or removing or transferring tbe superintendent were present, most all of tbe ills to
which tbe Indians are subjected would be removed." 1934 House Hearings, supra note
29, at 261. Discussion surrounding tbis presentation revealed tbat local agents or super•
intendents could be continued in office almost indefinitely by tbe commissioner, appar•
ently on tbe theory tbat such tenure was necessary to tbeir job security. The tribes
had no right to remove tbe agent; tbey could do no more tban request transfer.
86. Haas, The Indian Reorganization Act in Historical Perspective, in NATIVE .Ar.rnnICAN LAW MANUAL 488, 491 (M. Price ed. 1970) [hereinafter M. PRICE].
87. Id. at 491-92. Commissioner Collier, who, as usual, had anticipated tbe new
approach, held nearly a dozen conferences throughout tbe country in early 1934 to
propose and explain tbe bill to Indians and to hear their suggestions and criticisms.
See F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 84.
88. See note 159 infra.
89. See BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 22; M. PRICE, supra note 86, at 493.
90. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
91. See, e.g., Constitution and By-Laws of tbe Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, art. II, § 3, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. II, at 49;
Constitution of Oreavilla Apache Tribe of New Mexico, art. III, § 3, in G. FAY, s1,pra,
pt. III, at 5.
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the IRA, most Indians had had little experience in managing their
own affairs. 92 In large part, of course, this was true of the generation
of Indian leaders in the 1930's primarily because of the application
of administrative authority in harsh form during the preceding years.
The sponsors and supporters of the IRA saw in it a major change
in the pattern of Indian governance. It would be incorrect, however,
to assume that constitutional self-government was a new phenomenon
in Indian affairs in an historical or legal sense. A survey of the Indian
legal experience suggests that the IRA was really resurrecting and
revitalizing older forms and concepts.
C.

The Prior Indian Legal Experience and the Effect of the IRA

The origins of the concept of tribal autonomy and of the inherent
right to self-government have previously been discussed. 93 Case law
has established that in the absence of congressional action this right
includes not only the power to adopt and operate under a form of
government of the Indians' choice,94 but also the power to do such
things as regulate domestic relations of tribal members,95 levy taxes,96
regulate property within tribal jurisdiction,97 and administer justice. 98 If all of these powers already existed, why then was it necessary
to enact legislation "granting" to the tribes the power to organize for
purposes of self-government and to exercise these individual powers?
This inquiry becomes even more pertinent when one considers the
history of tribal political organization.
The first federal constitution on the American continent was
probably the Great Binding Law, or Ne Gayaneshagowa, of the Iroquois League, developed during the :fifteenth century.99 This constitution established a government subject to public opinion.100 One
purpose of this loose confederacy was self-protection. The war-making
power was exercised only on approval of the governing council.101
In accordance with the concept of federalism, this council had no
92. 13ROPHY CoMMISSION, supra note 18, at 35.
93. See text accompanying notes 3-9 supra.
94. Cf. Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1927) (dictum tbat tribal
law determined authority of agent). See generally Solicitor's Opinion, Power of Indian
Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 30-32 (1934).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
96. See Duster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906).
97. See Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 441, 447 (1914) (dictum).
98. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
99. The Iroquois League was also known as tbe Five Nations, and consisted originally of tbe Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk tribes. The League
became tbe Six Nations with the admission of the Tuscarora in 1724. PARKER ON THE
IROQUOIS (W. Fenton ed. 1968); C. CoLDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE FIVE NATIONS (1958 ed.).
100. C. COLDEN, supra note 99, at xx.
101. Id.
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power to interfere with internal affairs of the various member tribes.
The highly developed confederacy of the Iroquois foreshadowed in
many respects the federal system in the United States.
Probably the best known early Indian constitutions were those
of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes,102 especially that of the Cherokee Nation, first adopted in 1827.103 The Cherokee constitution was
reduced to ·writing as early as 1839.104 So amazing was this document
that one court was prompted to say of it, more than a half century
later:
[F]or more than half a century it has met the requirements of a race
steadily advancing in prosperity and education and enlightenment
so well that it has needed, so far as they are concerned, no material
alteration or amendment, and deserves to be classed among the few
great works of intelligent statesmanship which outlive their own
times .... And it is not the least of [these] successes ... that the
judiciary of another nation are able, with entire confidence in the
clearness and wisdom of its provisions, to administer it....100
Although the Cherokee constitution was perhaps the most outstanding example, there were many others, less well known.100 "The writing of Indian constitutions under the [IRA] is therefore no new thing
in the legal history of this continent ...." 107
It is, of course, not essential that a tribe or any group of people
have a ·written constitution before they can govern themselves. The
right to self-government exists as well in tribes whose organizational
structure may have been based on ancient custom or tradition. Certainly all the tribes were not politically developed to the same degree,
and therefore some were less able than others to put into practice
their inherent governmental powers. Nonetheless, these powers existed in all the tribes.
Indian tribes seem also to have been regarded as corporate bodies
for some purposes prior to enactment of the IRA. In at least one
instance there had been specific incorporation by legislative act. 108
102. The Five Tribes were the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole
nations, See A. JOSEPHY, supra note 9, at 107.
103. STARR'S HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 55
Gregory &: R. Strickland ed.
1967).
104. The Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation, 1839-51 (1852) (published
by the Cherokee Nation at Tah-le-quah, in Cherokee language).
105. Journcycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 318 (1893), afld., 155 U.S. 196
(1894). For more on the Cherokee and their development, sec R. CoTIERILL, THE SOUTH•
ERN INDIANS (1954); M. WARDELL, A POLIIICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1887•
1907 (1938); G. WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES (1968).
106. Cohen lists sixty-five tribes for which written constitutions or other organic
documents were recorded in the Interior Department prior to 1984. F. CoHEN, supra
note 2, at 129 n.59.
107. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 129.
108. Leyes del Territorio de Nuevo Mexico 1851, at 418-19 (incorporation of certain
Pueblos).

cr.
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Further, if the term "corporation" is used in the broader sense of
designating an identifiable group of people to whom a legal personality is affixed, then it becomes clear that tribes have often been
assigned a corporate status. For example, there were federal statutes
authorizing suits by injured persons against tribes whose members
had committed various depredations. 109 Under these statutes liability
was tribal only; no liability was imposed on individual members.
The distinction between the tribe and its members had also been
emphasized in cases involving property rights110 and other commonlaw legal rights. m
The question of tribal capacity to sue and be sued, in the absence
of statutory authority, also appeared occasionally. Where a tribe was
recognized as a distinct political community or even as a political
subdivision, it was immune from suit unless it had consented thereto,
following the general rule of sovereign immunity.112 Moreover, when
the tribe was immune, it was held that tribal officers could not be
sued on tribal obligations.113
Whether a tribe could bring suit without statutory authorization
was a more difficult question, although probably answered in the affirmative. Cases in which tribes were parties to the suit have been
entertained by the courts, apparently without any question of standing or capacity being raised.114 In any case, the objectives of such a
suit could have been obtained through a representative suit brought
by individual tribal members.115
Thus, the powers and capacities "granted" to Indian tribes by
the IRA had, in large part, previously existed. This fact has been
recognized by those who have closely examined the Act. Commentators have said, for example, that "the constitutions [adopted pursuant to the IRA] add to, but do not detract, from, the powers of an
Indian tribe ...." 116 But precisely what was added? The answer is
109. E.g., Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 1, 23 Stat. 376; Act of March 3, 1891,
ch. 538, § I, 26 Stat. 851. See also Graham v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 318, 331-38 (1895).
110. See Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912) (individual Cherokees had no rights in
land vested in tribe); Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 U.S. 56 (1909) (grant of land to Choctaws under treaty was to tribe as such, not to the then members). See generally F. CoHEN,
supra note 2, at 183-94, 287-347.
111. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (tribe not liable at common law for torts committed by members); Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850)
(tribal officer not responsible for tribal debts).
112. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895) (suit not maintainable against
tribe without clear congressional authorization). See also United States v. United States
Fid. &: Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (tribe also immune from cross-claim without congressional authorization).
113. Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
114. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Pueblo of Zia v. United
States, 168 U.S. 198 (1897).
115. See, e.g., Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 U.S. 56, 57 (1909), a suit in equity by and
on behalf of some 13,000 "persons of Choctaw or Chickasaw Indian blood and descent."
116. M. PRICE, supra note 86, at 492.
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that the IRA apparently added nothing in terms of specific substantive powers. From this, however, it does not follow that the IRA accomplished nothing. As previously noted, the mere fact that Congress
was willing, with the blessing of the Interior Department and the
Indian Office, to enact such a statute signified an abrupt change in
policy. Because of this policy change the tribes were able, at least
temporarily, to coordinate effectively their organizational efforts and
to use these powers for their benefit.
Furthermore, the IRA can be said to have had a stabilizing effect
on tribal powers. 117 This effect is more significant in light of the erosion of these powers that had taken place during the previous century.
The IRA reaffirmed the principles of tribal self-government. Better
organizational machinery could now be worked out through proper
definition or limitation of tribal powers in the constitutions and
charters. Finally, the mere act of organizing to write an organic instrument in the form of a constitution may have been a stimulus
for more effective government, especially if the tribes could be assured that their efforts would not be undermined by arbitrary administrative action.

D. Experience Under the IRA
During the two-year period within which tribes could accept or
reject the IRA,118 258 elections were held. 119 In these elections, 181
tribes (129,750 Indians) accepted the Act and 77 tribes (86,365 Indians, including 45,000 Navajos) rejected it.120 The IRA also applies
to 14 groups of Indians who did not hold elections to exclude themselves.121 Within 12 years, 161 constitutions and 131 corporate charters had been adopted pursuant to the IRA. 122 The experience of
these tribes has been as varied as the tribes themselves. It is difficult
to determine whether this experience has on the whole been beneficial. Such a judgment would depend on a great variety of factors,
including previous political and organizational experience, available
resources, and abilities of tribal leaders. For this reason, it would be
unrealistic to pronounce a single judgment on the efficacy of the Act.
117. Id. at 493. This stabilization, alas, could not last. See generally Erosion of
Rights, supra note 62; note 159 infra.
118. See note 65 supra.
119. T. Hass, Ten Years Tribal Government Under IRA 3 (U.S. Indian Serv., Tribal
Relations Pamphlets 1947) [hereinafter Haas]. This figure excludes tribes in Alaska
and Oklahoma, which were brought under the Act automatically.
120. Id.
121. Id. It is not clear why elections were not held since the Act appears to require
them. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1970).
122. Id., Table B, at 21-30. There are also some tribes that have accepted the IRA
but operate under constitutions adopted previously, and other tribes not under the
IRA which nevertheless operate under constitutions. Id., Tables C &: D, at 31-34.
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Indeed, the diversity of experience suggests the presence of a minor
paradox: the IRA seems to have led directly to both advances and
reverses in tribal development.
The constitutions and charters themselves vary considerably, especially with respect to the forms of government adopted, "ranging
from ancient and primitive forms in tribes where such forms have
been perpetuated, to models based on progressive white communities.''123 Likewise, the powers vested in the tribes through these· documents "vary in accordance with the circumstances, experience, and
resources of the tribe."124 On the other hand, there are provisions
which appear in most constitutions in nearly identical terms. 125 Most
governments established under the IRA, unlike federal and state
governments, have no provision for the separation of powers. The
governing body is the tribal council, and in many instances it acts
in a legislative as well as executive capacity.126 The council members,
acting either in their capacity as elected political officials or as directors of the tribal corporation, also manage the common resources of
the tribe.127 While it is often assumed that such a unification of powers is undesirable, most tribes have operated well under a unified
system.
The law and order codes adopted by the various tribes reveal
much about their approach to government. Tribes or other selfgoverning Indian groups generally have adopted codes, although
some instead use regulations promulgated for that purpose by the
Secretary of Interior.128 The character of these codes differs profoundly from that of state penal codes. Tribal codes typically delineate forty or fifty offenses,129 whereas state codes, exclusive of local
ordinances, often list hundreds or even thousands of offenses.130 The
tribal codes generally do not contain the catch-all provisions, such as
vagrancy and conspiracy, so common in state codes.131 Punishment
under tribal codes has traditionally been much less severe, seldom
exceeding imprisonment for six months even for such offenses as
123. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 130.
124. Id.
125. Compare Constitution and By-laws of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South
Dakota, art. III,§ 1, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. I, at 65, with Amended Constitution
and By-laws of the San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, in G. FAY, supra, pt. ill, at 36.
126. See, e.g., Revised Constitution and By-laws of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of
Wisconsin, art. III, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. II, at 84.
127. See, e.g., Amended Charter of the Mescalero Apache Tribe of New Mexico, § 4,
in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. ill, at 14; Amended Charter of the Hualapai Tribe of
Hualapai Reservation, Arizona, § 4, in G. FAY, supra, pt. ill, at 86.
128. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.1 to 11.306 (1971).
129. Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 155-56.
130. For example, in the Michigan statutes there are more than 3000 offenses calling
for punishment.
131. Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 156.
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kidnapping.132 In fact, except for stating a maximum penalty, tribal
penal codes often leave wide discretion in the tribal court to adjust
penalties to circumstances of both the offense and the offender.133
The form of punishment traditionally has not been imprisonment
but rather forced labor for the benefit of the victim or the tribe.184
Finally, the tribal codes are generally available to the members and
are widely read and discussed.185
Those in most direct contact with the IRA and the tribes operating thereunder give perhaps the best indication of tribal experience. The June 1939 issue of Indians at Work 186 was devoted entirely
to Indian reorganization, and contained many short pieces by tribal
council members and federal field agents. Every article was full of
praise for the IRA and encouragement for the future. 187 Failures
were attributed to lack of experience with self-govemment.138 An
example of the kind of promise held out by the IRA can be found in
Commissioner Collier's lead editorial, which quoted a letter from an
Indian leader:
"Before the fact of Indian organization, of Indian democracy under
the Reorganization Act, can be an accomplished one, the Indians
must come to the point of identifying themselves with the organic
documents which are now theirs. They must come to the point of
caring intensely, of speaking out, if necessary of fighting, for what
comes to them at first as an inert possession."139
Typical was an article by Willie George, Chairman of the Tribal
Council of the Shoshone-Bannock tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation:
Since we have organized under this Reorganization Act, the council
is doing things for the people. We had organized councils before,
but they were different. For one thing, the people are listening to the
council as they never did under the old system. And then, the council
has certain powers in handling the affairs of the reservation which it
never had before ....
Since the Indians took up the new Reorganization Act, the council
has taken over a lot of work that the Agent used to do for them,140
132. Id. Kidnapping, although a serious crime, has not been added to the list of
crimes taken from tribal jurisdiction. See note 17 supra and accompanying text,
133. Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 156.
134. Id.
135. Id. Cohen concludes that "[t]he comparison suggests that perhaps the Indian
penal codes may be more 'civilized' than the non-Indian." Id.
136. This magazine was published by the Department of Interior, Office of Indian
Affairs. Its life span was twelve years, lasting from August 1933 to June 1945.
137. E.g., Land Purchases in Nevada, INDIANS AT Worut, June 1939, at 11; Jennings,
Indian Reorganization, id. at 13; Mustard, Rehabilitation on the Land, id. at 24,
138. Reifel, Organizing the Sioux, id. at 29.
139. Id. at 3, 6-7, quoting D'Arcy McNickles, a Flathead Indian.
140. Id. at 31, 31·32.
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Not everyone, however, agreed with this optimistic assessment.
In 1945 a bill to repeal the IRA was introduced in Congress.141 This
bill simply provided for the repeal of the IRA and its amendments
and the disposition of unexpended funds. No indication was given
concerning the fate of existing constitutions and charters. In the brief
hearings held on this bill, the Senators' questions and other testimony
demonstrated how poorly the IRA was understood. The committee
members repeatedly found it necessary to refer questions for clarification to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William A Brophy and
former Assistant Solicitor Felix S. Cohen.142 These hearings show that
Indians on the same reservation had conflicting opinions on the IRA.
In opposition to the Act, Peter Red Elk of the Pine Ridge Sioux, who
claimed to represent a majority of the tribe, stated that "[t]here is
no more authority in the tribal council because of the [IRA] ....
The superintendent is the one who has all the authority. It is a fact
that under the [IRA], all authority the Indians previously had has
now been taken away."148 Peter Red Elk charged that the vote taken
on application of the IRA was invalid because "[m]embers of the
tribe woh [sic] never voted were fraudulently signed up as though
they were in favor of the act."144 Another complaint was the alleged
discriminatory distribution of tribal funds by the superintendent "in
favor of the mixed bloods to the exclusion of the older full blood
Indians ... who are asking for a repeal of the [IRA]."145
Moses Two Bulls, a member of the tribal council of the Pine
Ridge Sioux, disagreed strongly with Peter Red Elk and testified to
the accomplishments resulting from organization under the IRA. He
explained, for example, the operation of the tribal cattle business.146
Capital came initially from IRA loan funds and the leasing of tribal
lands. Cattle were purchased, raised, and marketed, with the goal of
eventual tribal self-support. Employment of tribal members had
grown. "We have tried to make a program which will benefit the
whole tribe.... Before [the IRA], it was the superintendent and
his representatives [who controlled the programs] .... Under this
141. S. 978, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
142. E.g., Hearings on S. 978 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian A.flairs, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, 15 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 Hearings].
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. The Pine Ridge vote was taken on October 27, 1934. Of a voting population
of 4075, 2264 voted: 1169 for, 1095 against. A constitution was approved on January 15,
1936; no charter bad been ratified. Haas, supra note 119, Table A, at 19, Table B,
at 25. Vine Deloria, a Sioux, has said of Sioux politics that "a ten-vote margin ••• is a
landslide victory." V. DELORIA, CuSTER DIED FOR YOUR Srns: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 29
(Avon ed. 1969).
145. 1946 Hearings, supra note 142, at 7. Peter Red Elk did not document his
charges. His over-all testimony reveals his fear that the Indians would lose their
allotted private lands and his desire to keep his, despite the fact that § 8 of the IRA,
25 U.S.C. § 468 (1970), prohibited any such confiscation.
146. 1946 Hearings, supra note 142, at 12-18.
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law, the Indians are able to try a program for themselves and make
it stick...." 147
Senator Wheeler asked if Moses Two Bulls was in favor of the
IRA. In response to this question and to the earlier testimony of
Peter Red Elk and other critics, he stated: "Yes. We are just getting
started. It is only 10 years old. How long did it take the United States
Government to form a perfect organization? It takes time.... A man
comes here and says this law is not good, after 10 years. That is too
short a time." 148
There are numerous other testimonials to the success of the
IRA. 149 It would seem that advances under the Act have outnumbered shortcomings. In any case, the fact that some tribes may not
have benefited from the Act does not justify blanket condemnation.
One philosophy underlying the IRA was flexibility and consideration
of differences among tribes. This philosophy was to be implemented
by allowing the tribes to choose to be under the Act and to vary their
governments and economic organizations. It is precisely this flexibility that sets the IRA apart from all previous major Indian legislation
and justifies its continuation.
A by-product of the IRA has been better control and management
of tribal property. Under the earlier allotment policy the tribal land
base was consistently diminished through the parceling of land to
individual Indians; consequently, management of land use was difficult. Even after the IRA land management remained a problem on
some reservations because of the earlier parceling.100 However, IRA
funds have been used to reacquire much of this previously allotted
land. Out of the renewed land base such developments as livestock
cooperatives and tribal farming enterprises have arisen.101
To be sure, the IRA has not worked perfectly. One major shortcoming has been the Act's inability to fulfill the promise of shifting
to Indians the control of Indian affairs. The reasons for this failure
are diverse, although a major factor has been bureaucratic attitude.
As one report noted:
The [IRA] illustrates how a law intended to strengthen tribal
governments and to give the people responsible business experience
through making their own decisions has in fact actually increased
federal control over them .... [E]very constitution adopted under
the statute requires the Secretary of the Interior to review nearly all
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., J. CoLLIER, ON THE GLEAMING WAY 144-49 (1962) (the remarkable
economic development of the Apache Tribes under the IRA); V. DELORIA, supra note
144, at 141.
150. Haas, supra note 119, at 8-9. For a discussion of the results of allotment, see
text accomp~ying notes 32-36 Sllpra.
151. Id.
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ordinances in various categories, notably those which define and
punish offenses. Similarly, every [IRA] charter subjects to such approval almost the entire amount that a tribe can spend or make contracts for....
This refusal to allow Indians to learn by trial and error may have
had warrant in the 1930's at the time the first constitutions were
adopted, for most tribes then had little knowledge of how to conduct
a modern government and transact business in corporate form. Indeed, the corporate charters provided that the controls could be removed as the tribe gained experience, but in most instances the
restraints still remain, continuing to be imposed when new charters
are adopted.
This policy probably stems from the widespread belief among the
[Bureau of Indian Affairs] staff that as "guardian" or "trustee," the
Bureau itself must make the vital decisions.... [This idea] will continue to hamper tribal self-development until legislation or strong
executive direction dispels the doubts of Bureau employees.152
The IRA has encountered less subtle opposition from other quarters. Even in the earliest stages of its history, Indians were not the only
persons concerned with the IRA. A small, white propaganda machine
existed in Muskogee, Oklahoma, the center of approximately 100,000
Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes. This group had access to the
news media, and it issued periodic charges that grossly misrepresented
the Act and attributed fabricated statements to Commissioner Collier.153 Through these charges ran the theme that the Act was a
product of Moscow being put over on the Indians by the Roosevelt
Administration and that it was an "inhumane, unconstitutional, and
un-American scheme."154 A story based on "information" supplied
by this group appeared in the New York Herald Tribune on April
4, 1934.156 Under the headline "Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Urges Tribesmen of Oklahoma To Accept Soviet Type of Rule," the
story contained lies, distortions, and prophecies of horror, hardly
conducive to acceptance of the IRA. Investigation revealed that this
group had a substantial self-interest in defeating the IRA. The allotment policy had reduced Oklahoma Indian landholdings from 15
million acres to I½ million acres and had destroyed the tribes' ability
to be self-supporting.156 Seventy-two thousand members were totally
landless. If the law remained unchanged, most of the remaining land
would soon shift to white ownership, presumably to some members
of this group. The impact of such groups on the tribes' ability to
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 34-35.
See 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 178-85 (account by Commr. Collier).
Id. at 179.
Reprinted in id. at 180.
Id. at 183-84.
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function effectively under the IRA, to say the least, has been less than
beneficial.
In other respects, tribal governments are not unlike governments
everywhere, and suffer from defects in no way unique. Problems include "lack of leadership, lack of interest of the members, administrative incompetence, nepotism, too short terms for elective officials,
insecure tenure of employees, factionalism, insufficient funds, inadequate tax resources, and inability to remove the causes of crime and
of juvenile delinquency."157 Not all tribes have been plagued with
these problems, of course; but where these problems exist, government is weakened. The IRA could not eradicate the underlying
human factors. As stated above, lack of money is a significant problem. While funds are often available for a variety of programs
involving education, housing, or health, funds are not so easily
obtainable for business credit, jobs, land purchasing, and tribal
administration. 158 Finally, congressional actions have also had a profound impact on tribal self-government under the IRA. Chief among
these is the "termination" policy of the 1950's, which set as a goal the
abolition of tribal government and the Indians' special status and
which substantially undermined much of the progress made under
the IRA.159
157. BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 37.
158. The Johnson-O'Malley Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-54 (1970), from which many funds
come, authorizes appropriations for "the education, medical attention, agricultural
assistance, and social welfare, including relief of distress" of Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 452
(1970). These expenditures are made through a process of contracting between the
Secretary of Interior and the states or their political subdivisions, who in turn apply
the funds for the purposes indicated. Evidently there is no dollar limit on authorized
appropriations.
Section 10 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1970), authorized a revolving loan fund of
10 million dollars, increased in 1961 to 20 million dollars. These funds go directly to
the tribes to be used for economic development, but always subject to the discretion
and control of the Secretary. Expenditures under this provision are generally believed
to have been too low. See BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 22, For the tribal
record in repayment of these loans, see note 62 supra.
Two thirds of all Indian enterprises are now financed through private sources, U.S.
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPT. OF INTERIOR, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL Gov,
ERNMENT 16 (1965),
159. The concept of termination was first embodied in H.R. Con. Res, 108, 67 Stat,
Bl32 (1953), which reversed, as a matter of policy, most IRA principles. The policy was
partly carried out by Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch, 505, 67 Stat. 588, as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970), which conferred general jurisdiction
over civil causes and criminal offenses in "Indian Country" on the states of California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Tribes within these states no longer
exercise governmental functions independent of the state. Other states were granted
authority to assume such jurisdiction by affirmative act, although since 1968 tribal
consent has been required. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1970). A series of special acts
"terminating" certain tribes followed. See generally Hearings, Joint Comms. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) [hereinafter
Termination Hearings]; BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 179-213; V, DELORIA,
supra note 144, at 60-82.
Another action by Congress, which undercut tribal independence, was Title II of
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In sum, the most that can be said with certainty about the impact
of the IRA is that the experience of tribes exercising self-government
under the Act has been mixed. Since the termination years, it is
difficult to determine whether there has been a net gain or loss in
tribal advancement under the Act. As one writer has stated,
Under the [IRA] during the 1930's tribes were finally beginning to
move ....
In the 1950's and early 1960's tribes had to spend all pf their time
defending their lands and treaty rights from the whims of the terminationists. Little was done to develop the reservations because all
energies went into saving them from obliteration. Finally in the
1960's . . . funds began to become available for capital improvements ....160

In the end it must be concluded that the experience of the tribes
under the IRA has been positive. The Act provided a powerful
stimulus to tribal governmental organization and in many cases so
strengthened that organization as to enable continued development
despite fluctuations in administrative policy.
III.

WHAT FUTURE

ROLE FOR

THE

IRA?

Such self-governing entities as tribal corporations will very likely
play an even more significant role in future tribal development than
they have in the past. Yet, the techniques by which future tribal development will occur remain unclear. At the present time, there exists
in Indian affairs a fundamental dilemma. On one side, there is the
fact that after more than 300 years of subjection to white influence,
Indians to a very large degree maintain a cultural identity separate
and apart from the American mainstream. Recent movements such
as "Red Power"161 indicate that this identity distinction is likely to
continue. Tribes continue to demand greater political, economic, and
cultural freedom from governmental control. There is everywhere
expressed by Indians a deep-rooted fear that the termination policy
of the 1950's will return.162 As one Indian group recently stated,
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970), which in substance made the
Bill of Rights applicable to tribal governments. Previously, courts had upheld tribal
action exceeding constitutional limits imposed on the federal, state, and local
governments. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church
v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). See generally Lazarus, Title II
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. R.Ev. 337 (1969); Note,
The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1343 (1969); and the numerous volumes of hearings on constitutional
rights of the American Indian held by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1962-1968.
160. V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 141.
161. See generally S. STEINER, THE NEW INDIANS (1968).
162. A recent administration policy statement rejected forced termination. Message
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"Indian tribes nearly unanimously wish to retain exclusive jurisdiction vis-a-vis the states, over their mvn affairs." 163
Concurrently, however, Indian groups are making increased demands on the states for services, especially in the areas of education
and welfare. It is here the dilemma arises. The states may not continue to tolerate a situation that may require them to perform these
services and at the same time forces them to recognize the special
status that may free tribes from state taxation164 and such controls
as conservation regulations. 165 It has been suggested that "tension
between tribal and Western culture will pose an increasingly difficult
challenge to Federal Indian law."166 The fundamental challenge of
the future is to discover means by which existing laws and forms
can be used to anticipate these problems and to plan intelligent
solutions. It is submitted that the corporate form of organization, in
both political and economic contexts, is a device particularly applicable to the resolution of these problems. First, the majority of tribes
are presently incorporated under the IRA.107 Where such corporate
organization exists, it seems to be the logical focal point for developmental efforts. Tribes not currently incorporated should face no
insuperable difficulties in organizing since several of these unincorporated tribes are already organized around a tribal constitution.168
While incorporation under the IRA may not be available for these
tribes,169 they may be able to incorporate under state law if they have
not already done so.
Of even greater importance for future advancement is the corporate form's potential as a developmental tool for nonreservation
Indians. Urban Indian groups, of course, cannot incorporate under
the IRA. 170 Yet, the corporate form can also be utilized by these
groups. The bulk of this discussion has dealt only with organized
tribes, which today, for the most part, means reservation Indians.
from the President on the American Indians, 116 CONG, R.Ec. 23131 (1970). Nevertheless,
not all Indian fears have been allayed. See Statement of the Indian Members of the
National Council on Indian Opportunity to the Chairman and Federal Members, in 3
AM. INDIAN L. NEWSLEITER 50, 51 (1970).
163. Statement of the Indian Members of the National Council on Indian opportunity, supra note 162, at 59.
164. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903): Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam
County, 73 Wash. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442 (1968).
165. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Grune, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); People V,
Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971).
166. Fretz, The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal Governments, 6 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 581, 588 (1966).
167. See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
168. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
170. See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1970).
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But perhaps half of the Indian population in the United States is
neither on reservations nor within any officially recognized group or
tribe.171 Most nonreservation Indians live in large cities, often in
ghetto areas, although a few groups remain in small communities on
the East Coast.172 Urban Indians are too often ignored in studies.173
Problems of cultural identity and economic misfortune are not
easily left behind on the reservation. Indeed, there is much evidence
to the effect that these problems often become worse upon moving
from the reservation to the city.174 The ideas presented here should
be adaptable to nonreservation Indian groups seeking to advance
economically and simultaneously to retain their "Indianness."
It would be tempting to try to prescribe some broad economic plan
for Indian development using the IRA as a spring board. Such a
venture would be a foolhardy, if not an impossible, task. There are
more than 500 individual tribes, Native villages,175 and other recognized Indian communities or units in the United States today, as well
as numerous urban and local Indian groups.176 This number itself
s1,1ggests the unlikelihood of any one scheme fitting the needs of all
these groups and individuals. The problem is further complicated by
the profound differences that exist among various Indian cultures and
subgroups. For example, reservations range in size from the one-acre
Strawberry Valley Rancheria in Yuba County, California, to the 15
million-acre Navajo reservation that extends into three states.177 The
historical experiences among tribes have been even more varied,
ranging from the wealth-conscious tribes of the Pacific Northwest178
171. BROPHY CoMMISSION, supra note 18, Tables 1 & 2, at 215-18. The figures for
1960 show a total of 523,591 Indians. Of these, 344,951 are within or adjacent to "units,"
i.e., those for whom the Bureau of Indian Affairs provides some direct services. The
many qualifications placed on available figures make precise calculations of percentages
"on" or "off" reservations impossible. The Census Bureau's definition of "Indian"
further compounds the matter. See id. at 215. It is unlikely 'that an accurate count
could ever be made.
172, Id. at 11.
173. For example, the Brophy Commission expressly limits its primary concern to
"members of tribes, bands, and communities so recognized by the United States." Id.
at 11.
174. See, e.g., V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 243-57; Gabourie, Justice and the Urban
American Indian, 46 CAI.IF. ST. B.J. 36 (1971).
175. The term "Native" here refers to Alaska Natives, i.e., all aboriginal peoples
of the Alaska territory.
176. A. JoSEPHY, supra note 9, at 359, lists 284 separate Indian land units and 35
groups of other types of "public domain" allotments. This is exclusive of Alaska
Native villages. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203,
§ ll(b)(l), 85 Stat. 697, lists 209 Native villages.
177. A. JosEPHY, supra note 9, at 360.
178. Id. at 72-78; P. DRUCKER, INDIANS OF THE NORTHWFST COAST (Am. Museum Sci.
Books ed. 1963).
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to the impoverished bands of the Great Basin;170 from the deeply
religious and peace-loving Pueblos of the Southwest188 to the powerful
Iroquois League of the East.181
Furthermore, the needs of tribal groups vary significantly because
of differing legal and administrative experience. The legislative acts
discussed above are mainly of the type applying broadly to all
Indians. These, however, represent only a small fraction of Indian
legal history. There are literally thousands of statutes, treaties,
opinions of the Solicitor or Attorney General, and judicial decisions
relating to Indians. 182 The ovenvhelming majority of these apply
to only one tribe or only one group of tribes.183 Thus, even aside from
the vast cultural divergence, there are wide variances in the levels
from which future economic and legal development must begin.
No single model can be proposed for Indian development. Instead
the developmental schemes must be related to specific groups. Ideally,
the architects of these schemes will come from within the tribes or
groups themselves. Only in this manner can the concepts of selfgovernment and self-determination envisioned by the IRA become a
reality. Consequently, this discussion will be limited to consideration
of a legal form on which to build. The specific examples cited are
simply meant to illustrate possible extensions of these legal ideas.
The corporate form of organization lends itself to use in tribal
development, since it is "tribal" in its very nature. Incorporation
creates a recognizable legal entity around which to focus community
goals, be they making money or providing services to members.
Moreover, these goals are more easily effected by the use of the
corporate form. Prior discussion has emphasized the unique flexibility of the IRA.184 This feature should be capitalized upon, and
tribes originally voting against application of the Act should be
permitted to reconsider. Moreover, forceful removal of much administrative discretionary power may be necessary to allow proper
development.185
179. A. JosEPHY, supra note 9, at 123-29,
180. Id. at 146-80. See also C. Kr.UCKHOHN 8.: D. LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO (Natural
History Library rev. ed. 1962); F. WATERS, BooK OF THE HOPI (Ballantine Walden ed.
1969).
181. See authorities cited in note 99 supra.
182. In 1940, "more than 4,000" had been counted. Ickes (Secretary of Interior in
the Roosevelt Administration), Foreword to F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at xix. Dozens and
even hundreds more occur each year, a fact revealed simply by scanning through
various issues of the American Indian Law Newsletter.
183. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 66 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra; text preceding note 150 supra.
185. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text. More than one Indian leader
has called for a "leave us alone" law. E.g., V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 33-34. A recent
enactment in this direction was § 601 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970), which changed the law concerning tribal employment of legal counsel. Although
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Suggestions for greater utilization of the corporate form by Indian
tribes have appeared before. Continuation of tribal corporations, now
organized under state law, was recommended as the best method for
disposing of the property of terminated tribes.186 More recently, the
use of corporations has been a key factor in the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act. 187 The use of the corporate form in this Act illustrates
its current applicability to Indian problems. Few of the Act's objectives could have been accomplished without the use of corporations.
Two levels of corporate entities are provided for. Section 7 of this
Act divides the State of Alaska into twelve geographic regions
based on common heritage and coinciding with certain existing
Native associations. Each of these is to establish a Regional Corporation to conduct business for profit, and details of the corporate
structure are set out. Section 8 requires that the Native villages
receiving land under the Act incorporate Village Corporations.188
Both the Regional and the Village Corporations are to be organized
under state law. Elaborate provisions are also set forth to govern
distribution of funds and land.189
The significance of the corporate concept in this Act is reflected
by section 19, which revokes the existence of all reservations in Alaska.
Thus there is a transformation from an old to a new way of thinking.
Chartered corporate business entities rather than the old-style reservations are to assume the control of community life through the
direct participation of community members.
Other successful tribal projects include such widely varied efforts
as the Gila River Reservation Model Cities Program, industrial parks
in various Arizona reservations, "buy Indian" federal contracting,
road building and construction in southwestern reservations, the
manufacture of fishing boats on the Colorado River Reservation, the
Mescalero Apache ski resort, and experiments in vegetable growing at
Fort Yuma.190 Many of these successful projects presumably stem in
part from the tribes' existence as corporate entities chartered under
the IRA.
One example deserves special mention as a model of harmonious
co-existence between a modern economic enterprise and the traditional cultural and value systems. On the Yankton Sioux Reservation
government approval for such employment is still required, it is now deemed to have
been given unless specifically denied within ninety days. This enactment changes the
original position of § 16 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
186, Termination Hearings, supra note 159, at 242.
187. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688.
188. The Act itself, at § ll(b)(l), lists 206 separate villages subject to the Act, with
provision for additions.
189. Pub. L. No. 92-203, §§ 6, 9, 11-12, 14, 85 Stat. 690, 694, 696, 701-02.
190. See 117 CONG. REc. S. 5459-60 (daily ed. April 22, 1971) (speech by Sen. Paul
Fannin at Arizona Town Hall, April 18, 1971).
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in South Dakota, there is a factory that manufactures electronic
components.191 The work routine of this factory is highly unusual.
Each employee sets his own work schedule. He works as long as he
wants, when he wants. At the end of the month he is paid for the
amount of work that he has done. There are no white man's efficiency
experts. Despite its uniqueness, the enterprise has worked. Not only
have the tribal members retained their cultural identity in the
presence of this modern facility, but the factory's work has been
highly respected by midwestern electronics firms subcontracting with
it. Recently there has even been an expansion to enable the Santee
Sioux across the river in Nebraska to participate. The dilemma posed
by the desire to retain cultural identity and at the same time to enjoy economic advancement apparently has been resolved here through
use of the corporate form.
Other techniques using corporate organization are possible. An
experiment now being tested on the Salt River Reservation in Southern Arizona involves contracting between the state or local governments of Arizona and a tribe.192 The tribe provides services for its
members, using funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity and
other sources. It also contracts with the State of Arizona for such
services as water and sewerage. This experiment appears to have been
working well. It should be noted that the tribe involved is the
Papago, one to which a long history of special legal rules apply.193
Nonetheless, it would seem that other tribes incorporated under
the IRA or state law are ideal for this kind of experimentation.
Another striking example of the use of modern business techniques in tribal enterprise is that of the Jicarilla Apache tribe in New
Mexico. The once powerful Apache entered the twentieth century
as a lethargic, defeated people. Yet "in the past generation the
Apaches have transformed themselves [into] a modern cooperative
commonwealth, which has prospered by dealing in oil, gas and
timber leases, sheep and cattle."194 This transformation has come
about through use of their corporate status under the IRA and application of modern business techniques.
The development began with a small loan of $85,000 from the
federal government.195 In part, this money was used to acquire
land. Individuals also reconveyed landholdings to the tribe, further
191. A more complete account appears in S. STEINER, supra note 161, 124-26.
192. See V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 141-42. The project is authorized by 25 U.S.C.
§ 416 (1970).
193. The IRA itself reflects some of the Papagos' special status. In the Act and
amendments there are special provisions affecting only the Papago Tribe. See § 3 of the
IRA, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 463 to 463c (1970). See also 1934 Senate Hearings, supra
note 54, at 33-51.
194. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 18.
195. Id. at 41.
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strengthening the land base. From this, holdings in sheep and cattle
were expanded, leading to the marketing of beef and wool. Oil and
gas deposits were discovered and exploited, along with timber,
through leasing arrangements. Tourism was promoted through the
selling of hunting and fishing licenses. The tribe even financed a
motion picture.196
Tribal wealth has increased markedly. Between 8 million dollars
and 12 million dollars has been invested by the tribal corporation and
is producing income.197 Another 8 million dollars is due from the
federal government in settlement of old land claims. The tribe
operates a I million dollar scholarship fund. In 1971, approximately
$100,000 was received through hunting and fishing alone. The tribal
land itself, of course, is not valued, but it produces revenue through
the previously mentioned leases. The tribe also operates a small
factory, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe Industries.
The guiding principle throughout this development is modern
business techniques, adapted to the tribal form. The tribal council
performs the major planning functions, assisted in part by an
Albuquerque bank. It should be noted that despite the tribal development, the individual members are by no means rich. Individual
family income averages $4,000.198 This is supplemented somewhat by
freedom from such things as state property taxes and by availability
of such services as medical and dental care and some subsidized
housing. But the prospects for the future are bright. The relative
desolation a generation earlier emphasizes the tribe's economic
growth and convincingly demonstrates the potential of tribal development based on modern business techniques.199
One writer has suggested that corporations may be a vehicle by
which urban Indian groups may gain economic development and
retain cultural identity.200 Some urban Indian centers are already
incorporated as nonprofit organizations.201 The next step is to combine the resources of tribal corporations under the IRA and the urban
centers, forming corporations "for developmental purposes in which
both reservation and non-reservation people participate . . .. to ex196. Id. at 19.
197. Id. at 46.
198. Id.
199. For other modern tribal uses of the corporate form, see 116 CoNG. R.Ec. E 10448
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1970), containing an account of a tribal supermarket operated by
Blood Indians of Southern Alberta, developed with the help of Safeway Stores; Wall St.
J., April 12, 1971, at 20, col. 1, describing the Tyonek Management Corporation of
Alaska's Tyonek Indians, who used funds received from leases to the Humble Oil
Company for construction of modem houses, a school, street paving, and a power plant.
In both these instances, the people were able to retain their cultural identity while
developing economically.
200. V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 258-59.
201. See NATIVE AMERICAN LAW MANUAL 162 (M. Price ed. 1970).
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plore ideas of development outside either reservation boundaries or
urban centers."202 It is suggested that
[w]here ordinary white corporations serve to produce income from
capital invested, corporations ... [under] the new Indian scheme
.... ·will serve to coordinate community life. Earnings will be used
to provide services ordinarily received from various governmental
agencies. As economic independence becomes greater, independence
in other areas of life will follow. Indians can thereby achieve a prosperity not seen since the landing of the white man.203
IV.

CONCLUSION

The parallel benveen tribalism and incorporation has been suggested.204 It is not unreasonable to suggest therefore that the Indians•
long history of tribalism as a way of life makes corporate organization
a particularly appropriate means of modern Indian development.
The experiences discussed above show that the corporate form is
indeed amenable to Indian ways of business operation. It is also
very possible that continued use of corporate organization will facilitate a greater cross-cultural understanding in our society.200 Tribes
and other Indian groups can thus absorb the corporation, whether
chartered under the IRA or state law, as a useful tool for accomplishment of the desired ends.
We shall learn all these devices the White Man has.
We shall handle his tools for ourselves.
We shall master his machinery, his inventions,
his skills, his medicine,
his planning;
But we'll retain our beauty
And still be Indian.2os
202. V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 259.
203. Id.
204. See text preceding note 184 supra.
205. "In the corporate structure, formal and informal, Indian tribalism has its
greatest parallels and it is through this means that Indians believe that modem society
and Indian tribes will finally reach a cultural truce." V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at

224-25.
206. Poem by David Martin Nez, in S. STEINER, supra note 161. at 131.

